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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
CaseNo.20090489-CA

vs.
LUIS CERON,
Defendant / Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 7718a-l(3)(a) (2009 as amended) and 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2009 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State failed below to preserve its objection and then failed on

appeal to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding of prosecutorial "bad
faith" as it relates to the refiling decision for the case at bar?
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made in order to
preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15,145, 114 P.3d 551)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original). "When challenging factual findings, the
challenging party 'must begin by undertaking the arduous and painstaking marshaling
process.'" West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991);
see also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 20, 100 P.3d 1177 ("Even where the defendants
-1-

purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of
a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also
have a duty to marshal the evidence.").
2.

Whether the trial court properly acted within its discretion when, after

finding that the prosecution had acted in "bad faith" in refiling the case in disregard of
applicable refiling requirements, it dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to a narrow
due process exception of the Brickey line of cases?
"Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the decision will not be reversed by this
Court." State v Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \\6, 151 P.3d 171. "Interpretation of case law
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT
87,17,34P.3d767.
RULES. STATUTES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are
contained in this brief or Addendum A.
Utah R. App. P. 3(a)
UtahR. Civ. P. 11
Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a)
Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-1
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103
U.S. Const. Amend. V
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case, as already set forth in the State's Brief, is not
unnecessarily reiterated again in Mr. Luis Ceron's brief, although he clarifies,
distinguishes, or expounds on some of the case's procedural statements in his own brief.
The following transcripts relating to the Statement of the Case for both defendants, Mr.
Luis Ceron and Mr. Joel Pacheco-Ortega, are contained in the Addenda of the State's
Brief: the January 15, 2009, Hearing Transcript (contained in Addendum B of the State's
Brief) (hereinafter referenced in Mr. Ceron's brief as "1 s t PH Setting"); the February 26,
2009, Hearing Transcript (contained in Addendum C of the State's Brief) (hereinafter
referenced in Mr. Ceron's brief as "2nd PH Setting"); the April 2, 2009, Hearing
Transcript (contained in Addendum D of the State's Brief) (hereinafter referenced in Mr.
Ceron's brief as "Dismissal After 3 Settings"); the April 23, 2009 Brickey Hearing
Transcript (contained in Addendum E of the State's Brief) (hereinafter referenced in Mr.
Ceron's brief as "Court Ruling").1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
To the extent that a factual recitation is pertinent, the Statement of the Facts, like
the Statement of the Case, are contained in the State's Brief and will not be reiterated

1

The Ceron record on appeal appears incomplete, as it does not contain all of the above transcripts and it
contains two transcripts of the same February 26, 2009, proceeding. However, with all the transcripts
contained in the Addenda of the State's Brief, Appellant simply referenced those transcripts in his brief
on the assumption that all the transcripts for both defendants, Mr. Luis Ceron and Mr. Joel PachecoOrtega, were contained in the record as a whole following the consolidation of their respective appeals.
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again in Mr. Luis Ceron's brief, except for relevant clarifications, distinctions, or
elaborations in the body of his brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The magistrate appropriately exercised its discretion in ordering the case dismissed
under the circumstances unique to the prosecutorial abusive refiling. Having presided
over three prior preliminary hearing settings, the court was intimately familiar with how
the case had been handled. The court knew that the State knew that its key witness
(Michael Fleming) - represented to be integral to the State's ability to go forward at the
preliminary hearing - required counsel and could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at any time prior to bindover. At its own peril, the State
withheld evidence of other potential witnesses who may have been able testify in place of
Fleming.
When the magistrate initially dismissed the case without prejudice, it imposed
refiling limitations that accord settled case law. Rather than abiding by the court's order
or the judicial opinions, the prosecutor refiled the case in disregard of both governing
authorities. The magistrate made a factual finding that the State had acted in bad faith.
The "bad faith" or "abusive refiling practice" finding, not specifically preserved by the
State below nor appropriately presented on appeal, should remain undisturbed. With both
parties agreeing that abusive refiling practices may constitute a bar to refiling, the
magistrate's bad faith finding and its accompanying order must be affirmed.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE NARROWNESS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
In its brief, the State argues that "Brickey" s presumptive bar to refiling, however,
applies only when potential abusive practices that implicate due process or fundamental
fairness are involved." State's Brief, pages 18-19 (citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986)). With actual abusive practices involved in the case at bar, the State appears
to discount or minimize its own misconduct and the narrowness of the trial court's ruling.
The "bad faith" component or "potential abusive practices" language of Brickey
and its progeny was the narrow issue before the court. See Court Ruling at 27 (the court
below viewed the "core issue" as whether the prosecution acted in bad faith); id. at 35
("This issue before me today is about as narrow as I've ever seen it on whether or not [the
prosecution's] refiling as quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and
bad faith").
As noted by the court (and defense counsel), the cases following Brickey, which
provided some flexibility to the State in refiling matters, still did not excuse refilings
instituted in bad faith. Id. at 35; State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 16 (Brickey's
presumptive bar to refiling applies "when potential abusive practices are involved") cited
in State's Brief, page 24. Consequently, the State's reliance on the Brickey line of cases
that do not contain a bad faith or potential abusive practices' circumstance are
inapplicable here.
-5-

One collateral matter outside the narrowness of the issue presented is the
acknowledgment that in the court's prior order of dismissal without prejudice, see
Dismissal After 3 Settings, the State was able to refile against both defendants as long as
certain requirements were met. Hence, the initial procedural history of the case would not
have necessarily precluded the State from refiling the matter, had no other circumstances
later surfaced. Such a refiling was supported by the "without prejudice" designation and
the State references to State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767; State v. Atencio, 2004
UT App 93, 89 P.3d 191; and State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, 180 P.3d 186.
As explained below, however, the State's bad faith and subsequent abusive refiling
practices placed this case in a category different than the referenced citations. The
prosecution's reliance on its cited cases is inapposite to the narrowness of the court's
ruling.
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE AND
PRESENT ITS OBJECTION TO THE COURT'S FINDING OF BAD
FAITH
The prosecution below acknowledged the bad faith or abusive practices'
exceptions to Brickey, id. at 22 (citing State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767; State v.
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, 89 P.3d 191; State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, 180 P.3d 186),
although it seemed oblivious to the extent of its own misconduct and the bad faith
application to the case at bar. The court's ruling narrowly focused the issue as one
involving prosecutorial bad faith, with a specific finding that the prosecution's improper
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refiling "rose to the level of abuse of practice and bad faith." Court Ruling at 35.
However, the State at the trial level failed to contest the court's "abuse of practice and
bad faith" findings. Following the court's pronouncement of its findings, the State said
nothing. Court Ruling at 38.
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made in order to
preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15,145, 114 P.3d 551 (emphasis
added) (alteration in original); see also Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d
1122 ("[B]ecause Mr. Coleman did not properly raise these three issues in the trial court
and thereby preserve them for appellate review, and because he argued plain error or
manifest injustice for the first time in his reply brief, we decline to review them.").
The State on appeal has since contended, "The State preserved this issue in its oral
argument opposing the motion to dismiss." See State's Brief, page 2 (citing T09:l 1:1526). However, the arguments by the prosecutor during oral argument appeared premised
on the wrongly held assumption that he had done nothing wrong - a position viewed with
"interest" and bewilderment by the trial court. See Court Ruling, pages 15-30. Further,
the prosecutor did not directly confront the trial court's earlier and more critical
admonitions about the refiling prerequisites, the extent to which he had ignored the
court's order, and how the resulting abusive refiling practice could be viewed as having
been undertaken in bad faith. Id Instead, most of the prosecutor's oral argument
outlined the procedural history of the case, albeit such a recounting fell outside of the
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narrow issue before the court. Id.; State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867, 2008 UT 58, ^[17 (Utah,
2008) ("if a party makes an objection at trial based on one ground, this objection does not
preserve for appeal any alternative grounds for objection").
On appeal, the State attempted to back the deputy District Attorney's actions by
asserting, "[t]he magistrate's finding of bad faith, therefore, was clearly erroneous."
State's Brief, page 34. In doing so, however, the State's brief failed to marshal the facts
in support of the lower court's finding of prosecutorial bad faith. Either the lack of
preservation below or the lack of marshaling of the "devil's advocate" facts on appeal
constitute a basis for rejecting the State's argument on appeal.
"When challenging factual findings, the challenging party 'must begin by
undertaking the arduous and painstaking marshaling process.'" West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991).
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent excerpts
from the record readily available to a reviewing court. The marshaling process is not
unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw
in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate
court that the court'sfindingresting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
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The marshaling requirement is not satisfied if parties just list all the evidence
presented at trial, or simply rehash the arguments on evidence they presented at trial.
Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233,ffl[21-22, 217 P.3d 733, 743-44; see Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 20, 100 P.3d 1177 ("Even where the defendants purport to
challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's
application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty
to marshal the evidence.").
Despite the State's claim that "[t]he magistrate's finding of bad faith, therefore,
was clearly erroneous[,]" State's Brief, page 34, the lack of a specific objection below,
together with a lack of arduous and painstaking marshaling on appeal, precludes such a
challenge now to the trial court's "bad faith" factual determination.
The pill that is hard for many appellants to swallow is that if there is
evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal problem—a "fatal flaw"— with that
evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence that
would have supported contrary findings. After all, it is the trial court's singularly
important mission to consider and weigh all the conflicting evidence and find the
facts. No matter what contrary facts might have been found from all the evidence,
our deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires us to take
the findings of fact as our starting point, unless particular findings have been
shown, in the course of an appellant's meeting the marshaling requirement, to lack
legally adequate evidentiary support.
^/m^//,217P.3d733n.5.
The court's finding here of prosecutorial "abuse of practice and bad faith" stands
intact on appeal, Court Ruling at 35, especially given the deference afforded the trial
court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder. Id.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S REFILING WAS
UNDERTAKEN IN BAD FAITH
Assuming, arguendo, the State's arguments on appeal were properly preserved and
presented, the State does not explain how the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling.
Indeed, the court carefully balanced the interests of both sides: "I [the court] really take
that responsibility seriously - to weigh the prosecution's right to freely prosecute against
very, very important defendant due process restrictions and my [the court's] analysis has
to involve prosecutorial good faith, even the new cases still say absent abusive factors,
absent prosecution bad faith, absent the innocent miscalculation I think is what the phrase
is on some of the newer cases, then the State can refile." Court Ruling, page 35. After
weighing the respective circumstances, the court explicitly rejected the suggestion that the
State had acted in good faith. The court's oral ruling is explained in full:
The Court:

Okay. Thank you.

All right. I find it very interesting that the State prefaces its argument as to
whether or not the refiling of this, these very, very serious first degree felonies was
in good faith or not with how serious these charges are. I am acknowledging at the
very beginning of my ruling that these are the most serious, the next to most
serious, I guess. They are first degree felonies, they are dealing with serious
personal assaultive attacks on human beings. We're not dealing with property
offenses. We are dealing with very, very serious offenses and that is what was
first and foremost in my mind when I addressed whether or not it was fair and just
to dismiss these counts without prejudice even without prejudice at the last hearing
when the State was unable to go forward. Because Mr. Flater had been here for
the first time I believe, you might have been here on the initial hearing but the
second time when Mr. Bohn, Christopher Bohn was the prosecutor, you hadn't
been present and so I knew you were here first time at the last hearing and that Mr.
Fleming had in fact been present at other hearings. My recollection - and I asked
-10-

again today - was not clear on whether or not he was here by subpoena or here
because he had been transported as a witness while he was still in custody. But he
was here and the State had every indication from Mr. Fleming that they would be
able to put on a preliminary hearing with Mr. Fleming's testimony. It was
continued once. It was continued again and even on the third time I took into
consideration everything that has been argued by the State with me today to even
determine whether I was going to dismiss on that third time, precisely because Mr.
Fleming had been available or at least here and ready to testify and this was the
first time that Mr. Fleming was not present and ready to testify. I determined then
that it was appropriate to dismiss and to dismiss without prejudice because that
still afforded the State the opportunity to freely prosecute very, very serious
allegations when they were in a position to go forward with those cases.
I specifically asked Mr. Flater at the time if Mr. Fleming was the victim of this
case, more than just a material witness, if he was the one who had borne the brunt
of the beating, the vicious beating and holding the gun in the mouth and the other
allegations that are made in the probable cause statement because part of my
decision was going to be whether or not other victims had been involved and
whether they were here, whether there were other people who had suffered at the
hands of these allegations, at least what the allegations were, and my memory - and
as I reviewed the transcript again today, that Mr. Fleming is the victim here.
I asked Mr. Flater if the State could go forward without Mr. Fleming's testimony
and it was clear that he was the victim, he was the material witness and the State
needed to have him there to go forward and at that point I determined even though
these were very serious charges and this was the first time Mr. Flater had been here
and this was the first time Mr. Fleming had not appeared, that a dismissal without
prejudice was appropriate.
At that time - and that's what brings us to this hearing today and I've given that
much foundation because it is important for everyone to realize what I am
balancing today.
At that time I made the order that there was to be a dismissal without prejudice and
Mr. Flater stated on the record at the time anticipating the kind of ruling, that they
would immediately refile and at that point I specifically addressed with Mr. Flater
that if they were in a position, he either showed the paper or stated he had the
paperwork ready and would go immediately outside of my courtroom and refile
this case, that the paperwork was already ready, I questioned if the State was in a
position to refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary hearing.
-11-

That is the basis for refiling, basically you are stating to the court, you are
swearing that you are in a position to go forward with this case and you were
unable to go forward with the preliminary hearing because you did not have Mr.
Fleming,. When you stated you were going to immediately refile, I asked why you
couldn't just do the preliminary hearing then and we addressed what the Stale
could refile, that I was not barring refiling but it needed to be under circumstances
where you could go forward with Mr. Fleming's testimony. The reason again, that
I am doing this and it's in so much detail is because today we are here on what is
called a Brickey hearing.
Brickey is a very old case. It's 1986. I think we probably have children who are
older than that, some of us anyway, and it has been modified multiple times by
Atencio, by Morgan, by Redd, by some other cases that have been referred to today
and I am very familiar with those cases and much of the teeth has been taken out of
Brickey as far as barring the State from refiling because it recognizes the very,
very important right prosecutors have to freely prosecute terrible crimes or any
kind of crimes where they have the evidence to go forward and prosecute these
crimes but it doesn't negate it to the point where we can't, that the judge doesn't
have to - and I really take that responsibility seriously - to weigh the prosecution's
right to freely prosecute against very, very important defendant due process
restrictions and my analysis has to involve prosecutor's good faith, even the new
cases still say absent abusive factors, absent prosecution bad faith, absent the
innocent miscalculation I think is what the phrase is on some of the newer cases,
then the State can refile.
This issue before me today is about as narrow as I've seen it on whether or not Mr.
Flater's refiling as quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and
bad faith. I am weighing the factors that Mr. Falter has explained and that Mr.
Peterson has explained that Mr. Flater did go out and refile the case within a
couple of hours based upon somebody else's contact with Mr. Fleming or based on
a contact with Mr. Fleming's family members but no contact with Mr. Fleming
himself. The refiling occurred before there was any contact with Mr. Fleming
himself.
Even taking into consideration what has happened since then is the State chose that
they still have not had any contact with Mr. Fleming himself. They are relying on
other cases that are holding him, presentence orders that are holding him, pretrial
orders that are holding him, family members saying he's still in the Salt Lake basin
but even when the State is coming to respond to whether or not their filing was in
good faith, they can still not give me any basis that they have had contact with Mr.
-12-

Fleming. To now argue that, well, it doesn't matter if we had any contact with Mr.
Fleming because we can refile on other basis, simply is not persuasive to me today
because I specifically addressed that with the State before I dismissed the case
even without prejudice. I took all of that into consideration and even then the
State told the Court, in spite of the ruling that she had just made that they were
going to go out and refile this anyway, they had the paperwork ready and the fact
that there was no change in circumstances, didn't seem to deter them from refiling,
to then argue that going out and making a phone call or having a contact with a
family member and not following up anymore is so minimus that it is even an
indication of the bad faith because I specifically told the State that they would need
contact with Mr. Fleming, they would need to be in a position to come into this
court with that case in tact and if there was no change in circumstances between
when I was dismissing it because Mr. Fleming was not present and Mr. Flater said
they could not proceed on that preliminary hearing because Mr. Fleming was not
present, then I find that it was bad faith on the part of the prosecution to walk out
the door and upon a phone call with a family member that they anticipated would
hear from him and not even following up with any more attempts to try and get
them, that that rises to the level of bad faith.
I agree with Mr. Sleight that sometimes legally - sometimes when we hear bad
faith, we look at it outside of the legal parameters and I don't think that Mr. Flater
has tried in any way to not carry out his responsibilities but the restrictions he had
on him are there for a reason and I specifically addressed him for those reasons
and absent the fact that we had so specifically restricted them and addressed those
issues already, I might not be finding bad faith but when I did address them so
specifically, to then suggest that a simple phone call with a family member with
nothing more is not sufficient good faith. And I agree that when I balance all of
these issues that it seems unfair and improper to dismiss the case with prejudice,
but it was without prejudice when I was taking all of those factors into
consideration and it is that window of bad faith that means that the Brickey
standard requires that it is precisely under those circumstances that it cannot be
refiled. When the State went out and refiled it as quickly as they did with the
emotions that - well, we're just going to refile this anyway so anything the court
does or anything the defense does is meaningless because this is a horrible act and it is - and so we're just going to refile it anyway, is simply the type of
limitations that judicious prosecution cannot pass and I am not happy with the
result of what that means but I don't think that there is any other way to fairly
assess the very aggressive refiling when the State did not have an adequate change
in circumstances to come forward to the Court and swear that they could then go
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forward with the prosecution before they refiled. They simply refiled without
going through the necessary process that they needed to.
So I am granting the motion on the part of both of the co-defendants and
dismissing this case pursuant to the Brickey standard as well as the follow up cases
that specifically address abusive factors, find that these factors do rise to those
levels and the information is dismissed against Mr. Ceron and Mr. Pacheco Ortega.
Thank you.
MR. PETERSON: The dismissal is?
THE COURT:

With prejudice, it has to be. I think it has to be. Thank you.

Appreciate everyone's work. Thank you.
R 11:31-38; Court Ruling 31-38.
In accordance with the trial court's detailed ruling, since there was in fact evidence
to support its "abuse of practice and bad faith" finding, Court Ruling at 35, "absent a
legal problem ... with that evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample
record evidence that would have supported contrary findings." Kimball v. Kimball, 2009
UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733 n.5 (Utah App. 2009). The appropriateness of deferring to the
court's fact-finding role was confirmed by the prosecutor himself who acknowledged
doing what the court (and defense counsel) said he had done in the refiling. Court Ruling
at 18-19. Thus, "[n]o matter what contrary facts might have been found from all the
evidence," legally adequate evidentiary support existed for the trial court's finding.
In any event, the trial court's finding of prosecutorial "abuse of practice and bad
faith" was not clearly erroneous. The court's finding was well supported by the record
and in large part by the prosecutor, himself. Court Ruling at 35. The State's contention
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that such a finding was clearly erroneous is both procedurally and substantively
unsupportable.
POINT IV. REFILING MUST BE PROHIBITED WHEN THE
PROSECUTOR ACTS IN BAD FAITH OR WHEN POTENTIAL ABUSIVE
PRACTICES ARE INVOLVED
Both sides agree that Brickey and its progeny do not excuse a prosecutor from
"potential abusive practices that implicate due process or fundamental fairness...." State's
Brief, pages 18-19 (citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)); accord Court
Ruling at 22 (the prosecutor below also acknowledged that refiling may be prohibited
when there is "evidence of bad faith or misconduct of the prosecutor"); see Court Ruling
at 21-23 (the prosecutor noted the "abusive practices" exception of State v. Morgan, 2001
UT 87, 34 P.3d 767; State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, 89 P.3d 191; and State v. Zahn,
2008 UT App 56, 180 P.3d 186)).
In light of the trial court's "abuse of practice and bad faith" factual finding and
given the undisputed legal authority that condemns the prosecution from refiling in bad
faith or otherwise engaging in abusive refiling practices, see supra and infra Points
herein, the order of dismissal should remain undisturbed on appeal. Mr. Ceron asks this
Court to maintain the ethical and legal prohibitions against abusive refiling practices.
Brickey and its progeny guarded against potential abusive refiling practices which, in
turn, authorized the court below to dismiss the involved cases after finding an actual
abusive refiling practice.
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The court's order of dismissal is consistent with the following corollary principle,
whose standard the prosecutor had unquestionably failed to live up to:
Of course, a magistrate's discretion to grant continuances is not limitless. We
have held that "when a [party] moves for a continuance in order to procure the
testimony of an absent witness,... he must show that the testimony is material and
admissible, that the witness could actually be procured within a reasonable time,
and that due diligence had been exercised before making the request."
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, % 19, 151 P.3d 171 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
Had the magistrate granted a fourth continuance in the present case, under the above
standard the court would have exceeded its discretion because, at both the time of the
third preliminary hearing AND at the time of the State's refiling, the prosecution had not
shown that Mr. Fleming "could actually be procured within a reasonable time and that
due diligence had been exercised before making the request." Id.
One police phone call to a relative of Michael Fleming who may or may not be in
future contact with him did not show that he could actually be procured. Even after the
State had refiled the case and even after a further lapse of time which apparently
continued beyond the Brickey hearing, the State still had not contacted Fleming nor had
Fleming indicated a desire to respond to the State's messages:
This issue before me today is about as narrow as I've seen it on whether or not Mr.
Flater's refiling as quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and
bad faith. I am weighing the factors that Mr. Falter has explained and that Mr.
Peterson has explained that Mr. Flater did go out and refile the case within a
couple of hours based upon somebody else's contact with Mr. Fleming or based on
a contact with Mr. Fleming's family members but no contact with Mr. Fleming
himself. The refiling occurred before there was any contact with Mr. Fleming
himself.
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Even taking into consideration what has happened since then is the State ... still
have not had any contact with Mr. Fleming himself... even then the State told the
Court, in spite of the ruling that... they were going to go out and refile this
anyway, they had the paperwork ready and the fact that there was no change in
circumstances, didn't seem to deter them from refiling, to then argue that going out
and making a phone call or having a contact with a family member and not
following up anymore is so minimus that it is even an indication of the bad faith
because I specifically told the State that they would need contact with Mr.
Fleming, they would need to be in a position to come into this court with that case
in tact and if there was no change in circumstances between when I was dismissing
it because Mr. Fleming was not present and Mr. Flater said they could not proceed
on that preliminary hearing because Mr. Fleming was not present, then Ifindthat it
was bad faith on the part of the prosecution to walk out the door and upon a phone
call with a family member that they anticipated would hear from him and not even
following up with any more attempts to try and get them, that that rises to the level
of bad faith.
Court Ruling at 35-36.
The State's defiance of the court's order to contact Fleming before refiling the case
was evidence of a bad faith filing, Court Ruling at 35, and in line with case law limiting a
magistrate's discretion to grant continuances only after the State had established that a
witness could actually be procured. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \ 19; Court Ruling at 9 ("the
Court's order [was clear] that absent Mr. Fleming's cooperation and some indication of
Mr. Fleming's cooperation, that a refiling would be inappropriate...").
The State similarly failed to exercise "due diligence" in trying to secure Mr.
Fleming. In his own unrelated court proceedings, the State knew that Fleming was not
continually reporting to pretrial and he was a no show for a mandatory presentence
interview with AP&P. Exasperated with the State's inability to accept any responsibility
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for Mr. Fleming's absence, the court confronted the prosecutor with the daily proactive
actions taken by other prosecutors in his office:
Are you [the State] aware of how many times and [on] a regular basis bench
warrants are issued for failure to report to pretrial on a regular basis or for pretrial
revocation or for failing to appear for the presentence process? No warrants or
even a revocation of pretrial has been sought [by the State] on those minimal
issues with Mr. Fleming. You're just waiting until he fails to appear for
sentencing before you feel that you can get any documentation to take him into
custody? Is that what you're arguing to me, Mr. Flater?
Court Ruling at 25-26.
If a magistrate may exceed its discretion in granting a continuance without
requiring the State to first establish that it has fulfilled its legal obligation by actually
procuring a key witness with due diligence, the magistrate here established that it had in
fact acted within its discretion by not excusing the State from doing what it was required
to do.
Mr. Ceron and Mr. Pacheco-Ortega's case goes a level beyond the general State
failure to actually procure their key witness and to do so with due diligence. As discussed
herein, unlike the obligations that must be satisfied before the State seeks a further
continuance, in refiling its case the State may not, as it did here, mislead the court as to
the necessity of an absent key witness, withhold other evidence for presentation at the
preliminary hearing, receive and ignore a court order requiring it to procure Mr. Fleming
prior to refiling, anticipate a court order of dismissal and then refile the matter within
hours after, and in disregard of, the prior court order. The court's ruling should be
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affirmed. State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, If 16, 34 P.3d 767 ("when potential abusive
practices are involved, the presumption is that due process will bar refiling").
POINT V. THE PRESUMPTIVE BAR AGAINST REFILING APPLIES
WHEN THE PROSECUTION FORUM SHOPS OR WITHHOLDS
EVIDENCE
Additional reasons support deferring to the lower court's discretionary ruling. See
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,1j 21, 89 P.3d 155 ("an
appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the
trial court relied on some other ground"); Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) ("In its discretion, for
substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative
or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed").
In sum, we hold that "fundamental fairness," the touchstone of due process,
precludes, without limitation, a prosecutor from seeking an unfair advantage over a
defendant through forum shopping by harassing a defendant through repeated
filings of groundless and improvident charges, or from withholding evidence.
Overreaching by the State, in any of its forms, is the chief evil we sought to
prevent in Brickey.
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,fflf15-16, 34 P.3d 767 (emphasis added). "[D]ue process
... is concerned with potential bad faith or misconduct of prosecutors." Morgan, 2001
UT 87, at If 22 (cited in State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, at ^ 18, 89 P.3d 191); Brickey,
11A P.2d at 647 ("Considerations of fundamental fairness preclude vesting the State with
such unbridled discretion").
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A.

The State Improperly Attempted to Forum Shop the Dismissed Case

Fundamental fairness precludes the prosecutor from forum shopping. Morgan,
2001 UT 87,115. The State's brief claims, "Although the refiled case was initially
assigned to a different magistrate nothing in the record suggests that this was the result of
the prosecutor's request as opposed to random assignment. Indeed, the prosecutor here
agreed that the Brickey motion should be heard by the original magistrate." State's Brief,
page 30.2
The State's suggestion is a bit disingenuous under the circumstances of this case.
Judge Boy den's oral ruling informed the prosecutor that the court was immediately
dismissing the case at 1:50 p.m. on April 2, 2009. See Dismissal After 3 Settings at 10.
The court declined to follow the State's request to delay its order of dismissal for a few
hours until 5:00 p.m. that same day. The court felt like the State would not be able to
proceed with the case in good faith by securing the presence of its essential witness,
Michael Fleming, in such a short time frame. Id.
The prosecutor walked out of Judge Boy den's court room and, within hours of her
ruling, decided against specifically refiling the dismissed case with the very same judge
who had presided over the matter. Such prosecutorial abusive refiling was undertaken
even though in the court's ruling, just issued moments before, the court confirmed
2

The co-defendant in this appeal, Mr. Pacheco-Ortega, may supplement the record with a transcript
that sheds more light on the prosecutor's inaction or the State's "nothing in the record" contention in its
brief. Due to the consolidated nature of the Ceron and Pacheco-Ortega appeals, Mr. Ceron submits his
brief now and joins in the co-defendant's argument on this point, as well as other arguments in the
Pacheco-Ortega brief, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with his position.
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defense counsel's request for the prosecutor to "notify us" if he refiled the case.
Dismissal After 3 Settings at 11 (in response to defense counsel's request, "should the
State choose to refile this matter and I would appreciate if that's possible, just notify us
that you've refiled[,]" the Court ruled, "Certainly that...."). If the colloquy and court
ruling did not at least suggest that the State should give notice to the involved parties and
to refile the case with the same magistrate who had just dismissed it, case law clearly
required the prosecutor to do so.
"To eliminate this practice [forum shopping], the Utah Supreme Court held that
'when a charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, whenever possible, refile the charges
before the same magistrate.'" State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^[17 n. 5 (citation
omitted). The record is silent only as to why the prosecutor was unable to refile the
charges with Judge Boyden.
When the State was hailed into court on April 23, 2009, to justify his refiling
decision, the prosecutor had a case in hand - Atencio, - that expressly advised the
government to "refile the charges before the same magistrate." Court Ruling at 21;
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 17 n. 5. Rather than heeding the Atencio warning, whose
authority the prosecutor had curiously ignored just a few weeks earlier, the State refiled
the charges with a different magistrate. But the prosecutor had not forgotten, during the
two or three hour time span between the court's dismissal on April 2, 2009, and his
refiling before a "random" judge that very same day, which magistrate had recently
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dismissed his case. The prosecutor knew how to refile the matter with Judge Boyden, just
as defense counsel knew how to get the refilled matter again back in front of Judge
Boyden. The silent nature of the record is a deafening reflection of the prosecutor's
decision to intentionally not refile the case in front of Judge Boyden.
The prosecutor's stipulation to bring the refilled case in front of Judge Boyden was
merely because he had to. If the prosecutor did not agree to do so, his opposition would
have represented through his conduct what the Brickey prosecutor had represented with
his words. Brickey id. at 646 (the prosecutor there, "disagreed with the [first judge]...
[and wanted] to come back here every time and represent evidence until I get it bound
over"). Though the prosecutor here may have been smart enough to not disagree on the
record, the end result is the same. The State's forum shopping tactics evidences bad faith
and abusive filing practices in violation of Brickey. The court's order of dismissal may be
affirmed on that basis.
B.

At Its Peril, the State Improperly Withheld Evidence

"[U]nder the discovery and disclosure requirements applicable to the State in
criminal prosecutions, an attempt to hide evidence of consequence is destined to fail."
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, ^15,151 P.3d 171. "By doing so, a prosecutor risks a
dismissal and bar to refiling." Id. The prosecutor here not only risked dismissal, after the
court granted the dismissal, the prosecutor's decision to withhold evidence constituted a
bar to refiling. Withholding evidence is another example "of potentially abusive practices
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that bar refiling under the Brickey rule,..." 2006 UT 85, Ifl 1, a risk the prosecutor
intentionally undertook in this case.
At the very first preliminary hearing setting, the State both knew and received
notice that its key witness may not be able to testify. The prosecutor recognized that Mr.
Fleming "has a warrant outstanding so he needs an attorney." 1st PH Setting at 4. More
significantly, however, the State understood that if "Michael Fleming [took] the stand[,]
[h]e will be questioned and probably end up invoking the Fifth [Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination] ...." Id. at 5; U.S. Const. Amend. V. Counsel was appointed
to protect Mr. Flemings' constitutional rights. Consequently, early in the proceedings, the
State could and should have taken steps to arrange for other State witnesses to testify at
the next preliminary hearing.
Instead, the State proceeded to the second preliminary hearing with the same two
witnesses,3 even though the prosecution itself expressly acknowledged that Mr. Fleming's
hoped-for testimony was problematic due to his privilege against self incrimination. 2nd
PH Setting at 12 ("It was a problem where another person [Mr. Fleming] ... has a Fifth
Amendment right"). Again, then and there in light of its own known potential key
witness testimonial hurdles, the State could and should have taken steps to arrange for
other State witnesses to testify at the next preliminary hearing rather than to withhold
such evidence.
3

2nd PH Setting at 5 ("I [the State] have two witnesses, one is our victim witness [who is] in custody
and the other is a police officer"); 1st PH Setting at 4 ("We [the State] only have two witnesses, Your
Honor").
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Instead, the State proceeded to the third preliminary hearing, with the whereabouts
of its admitted "essential witness [Michael Fleming]" unknown. Dismissal After 3
Settings at 4. To worsen matters, the State was dilatory in not appropriately trying to
secure Fleming. See supra Point IV. For three successive preliminary hearings, the State
withheld evidence by failing to take advantage of the accompanying opportunity to
present alternative State witnesses in place of Mr. Fleming.
The State acted at its peril by placing all its eggs in one basket. The prosecution
relied completely and inappropriately on the speculative hope that Michael Fleming
would testify on its behalf- despite known testimonial hurdles. The State also
exacerbated matters at the third preliminary hearing by doing nothing to dispel the court's
suggestion that Mr. Fleming was the one and only key witness.
The Court: All right, thank you. I'm also reviewing the probable cause
statement and maybe Mr. Flater [the prosecutor] you can add some insight on this
one. Mr. Fleming is not only the key material witness, he was the victim?
Mr. Flater:

That is correct, Your Honor.

The Court:

So, were there other victims that were injured or -

Mr. Flater:

No. He was-

The Court:

He was the one that -

Mr. Flater:

-- the only one.
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The Court: The state does not have other victims of this case. You may have
incidental, but as far as the allegations, the most serious allegations, it's Mr.
Fleming, right?
Mr. Flater:

That's correct.

The Court: All right. Well, quite frankly, I think all of the attorneys here know
that I'm pretty flexible even with our policies of continuances on preliminary
hearings but by the third one, and there really just isn't a good faith basis that you
think you can get them and Mr. Fleming was certainly aware of the fact that the
hearings were going and was - he was appointed with counsel. He had been given
every opportunity to be cooperative in this case and with him being the listed
victim, ... I am going to grant the motion to dismiss.

The Court: ... the underlying basis of why I'm granting the Motion to Dismiss is
in fact Mr. Fleming's non-appearance today and it's now 10 minutes to 2:00. I
simply am not going to make any orders that would say that if that's refilled again
by 5:00 because then that's putting pressure on the refiling without taking into
consideration that you still don't have that witness. If that changes and you do and
the State feels like it can go ahead and refile this case in full good faith, that you
can go forward and in good faith think you will have the presence of the essential
witness and that all occurs by 5:00, then that's pretty good.
Dismissal After 3 Settings at 7-8, 10-11 (emphasis added). If the State did not
misrepresent that Mr. Fleming was a witness critical to its ability to conduct the
preliminary hearing, it certainly left the court with the impression that no other witnesses
would be used in his place (i.e. the court referencing "that witness" or "the presence of
the essential witness"). See also State v Rogers, 2006 UT 85, ^{16, 151 P.3d 171 (courts
may discourage "coddling a lack of preparation by giving the prosecution multiple
opportunities to prove it has a case").
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In short, the State withheld evidence for presentation at the first three preliminary
hearings. The prosecutor admitted as much, after the case was dismissed. Id. at <fll5
("under the discovery and disclosure requirements applicable to the State in criminal
prosecutions, an attempt to hide evidence of consequence is destined to fail" and "[b]y
doing so, a prosecutor risks a dismissal and bar to refiling").
Thereafter, unlike the prosecutor's earlier statements about how "key" or
"essential" its witness, Michael Fleming, was to its case, in an abrupt-about-face the State
ultimately acknowledged other evidentiary avenues that it had withheld:
Even without Mr. Fleming's availability, the State would still refile this case. Mr.
Fleming was the witness that the State was counting on to adduce evidence at the
preliminary hearing but if he became unavailable, the State - there are other
avenues that the State could proceed through to prosecute the defendants PachecoOrtega and Ceron. Those being, there were other - some of the physical evidence
that was collected at the scene, other witnesses, possibly co-defendants in the case.
There have been preliminary discussions with attorneys for the juvenile codefendants and although there is no agreement in place, there was an expressed
desire to discuss the possibility of having these individuals testify on behalf of the
State and so the State believes that there would be, even absent Mr. Fleming, that
there would be sufficient evidence through which the State could go again to a
preliminary hearing and proceed in a case against the defendants at trial.
Court Ruling at 20-21. Here, since the prosecutor risked the dismissal, which the court
granted, the concomitant bar to refiling should be maintained. The State must shoulder
the blame for withholding evidence and for not acting proactively - and in a timely
manner - when the circumstances of its key witness were less than ideal. In fact,
following the appointment of counsel to protect Mr. Fleming's Fifth Amendment rights,
the record does not indicate whether Mr. Fleming would have in fact testified or, instead,
-26-

invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. At the second and third preliminary
hearings, other State witnesses should have been present and prepared to testify in his
place. The State's withholding of evidence provides this Court with another basis for
affirming the lower court's order of dismissal. See Court Ruling at 36 (rejecting the
State's we-have-other-evidence proposal essentially because it had been withheld: "To
now argue that, well, it doesn't matter if we had any contact with Mr. Fleming because we
can refile on other basis, simply is not persuasive to me today....").
POINT VI. ABSENT A DISMISSAL OF HIS STATE CASE, MR. CERON'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE FURTHER COMPROMISED DUE TO
ITS EFFECT ON HIS FEDERAL CASE
Not only were Mr. Ceron's due process rights implicated by the above
prosecutorial misconduct, see Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at *f 22 (cited in State v. Atencio,
2004 UT App 93, at ^ 18, 89 P.3d 191) ("[D]ue process ... is concerned with potential
bad faith or misconduct of prosecutors" ), the unresolved status of the State's case and its
hold also effected the handling of his federal case. As Mr. Ceron noted, the federal court
declined to consider him for pretrial release due to the still pending nature of the State
charges. Dismissal After 3 Settings at 6. Following the dismissal of the more serious
State charges, the federal system would be able to independently and more favorably
consider Mr. Ceron's overall status. Id.
In addition to his federal pretrial release status, which was hindered by the
lingering nature of the State hold, in the event of a federal conviction Mr. Ceron's overall
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time of incarceration would have been prejudicially impacted by the pending and
unresolved nature of a State case. If his State case was not dismissed and if,
hypothetically, it ended up as a conviction or a plea resolution, its belated resolution could
have essentially resulted in a term of imprisonment consecutive to the federal case even if
a State judge had imposed the State sentence concurrently to the federal case. Such an
nuance exists because the federal system is not bound by a state judge's sentencing
recommendation.
Federal prison officials are under no obligation to, and may well refuse to, follow
the recommendation of state sentencing judges that a prisoner be transported to a
federal facility. Moreover, concurrent sentences imposed by state judges are
nothing more than recommendations to federal officials. Those officials remain
free to turn those concurrent sentences into consecutive sentences by refusing to
accept the state prisoner until the completion of the state sentence and refusing to
credit the time the prisoner spent in state custody.
Del Guzziv. U.S., 980 F.2d 1269, 1272-1273 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 1992) (Norris, J., concurring).
Mr. Ceron's due process rights were best served by the trial court's ruling:
I don't know but it seems likely in this situation that it's not a good faith request
that Mr. Fleming did not know [about the 3rd preliminary hearing date nor] is going
to be cooperative in this. The State certainly may get that, this case to that position
again but I am granting the motion to dismiss without prejudice. That just means
this case isn't going to be holding those [defendants] and I don't know if that's
going to make the difference in either the federal situation or in the immigration
[situation] but that's all been placed on the record and my ruling is as it stands for
whatever effect that has on the other issues.
Dismissal After 3 Settings at 9. The Court actions were appropriate.
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POINT VII. THE PRESUMPTIVE BAR AGAINST REFILING IS AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR PROSECUTORIAL BAD FAITH AND
POTENTIAL ABUSIVE PRACTICES
According to the State, "[t]he remedy for a prosecutor's contemptuous behavior,
however, is not to dismiss a serious felony prosecution with prejudice." State's Brief,
page 35. Contrary to its contention, however, the remedy for the prosecutor's
contemptuous behavior in Brickey was exactly that.
The criminal offense in Brickey was forcible sexual abuse, a serious felony
prosecution that our high court dismissed through its reversal of the circuit court's bind
over order. State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 645-45 (Utah 1986). The prosecutor's
contemptuous behavior there stemmed from his disagreement with the first judge's
decision to not bind over the felony charge.
Significantly, in Brickey the prosecutor was "right" - at least in a factual sense for
his assessment of the evidence. The second circuit court judge subsequently bound
Brickey over for trial on the forcible sexual abuse charge and then a district court judge
refused to quash the bindover order. Id. at 646. Thus, the independent and objective
assessment of two judges validated the Brickey prosecutor's refiling decision, finding that
such a serious felony prosecution should have been considered by a jury. With such
judicial review at the trial level, the Brickey facts did not necessarily constitute a
"groundless and improvident prosecution." Id. Moreover, in a legal sense, the Utah
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Supreme Court similarly suggested that the first judge may have been wrong in not
inferring a lack of consent or in not agreeing with the prosecutor. Id. at 645 n. 1.
Nevertheless, the appellate court reversed. The Brickey rationale focused on the
misdeeds of the prosecutor, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence or the
seriousness of the crime. There,
The State vigorously argues that an accused will be protected from harassment by
the good faith of the prosecutor. However, the courts have had occasion to
scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion accorded prosecutors, and that
scrutiny has revealed that the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection for the
accused. Numerous courts have noted the potential for abuse inherent in the power
to refile criminal charges.
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986).
The prosecutor in Brickey failed the attitude test in a manner analogous to the
prosecutor here whose misconduct and malfeasance rose to the level of "abuse of practice
and bad faith." Court Ruling at 35. There is little difference in the bad faith attitude of
the Brickey prosecutor, who "disagreed with the [first judge]... [and wanted] to come
back here every time and represent evidence until I get it bound over[,]" id. at 646, and
the prosecutor's bad faith in Mr. Ceron's case, who similarly disagreed with the circuit
court's first order of dismissal and then, having anticipated such a dismissal order, see
Dismissal After 3 Settings at 9, immediately came back to court to get it bound over
despite having been just instructed on the parameters of the prior court order. See Court
Ruling at 36 (the [court] restrictions he [the prosecutor] had on him [we]re there for a
reason and I specifically addressed him for those reasons [today] and absent the fact that
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we had so specifically restricted them and addressed those issues already, I might not be
finding bad faith but when I did address them so specifically, to then suggest that a simple
phone call with a family member with nothing more is not sufficient good faith....").
Prosecutorial bad faith and abusive refiling practices should not be ignored.
Although the Brickey opinion faulted the prosecutor for forum shopping, it could have
just as easily criticized him there, much like the court criticism here, for acting in bad
faith or engaging in abusive filing practices. A phrase synonymous with abusive filing
practices is forum shopping. The dismissal of the case in Brickey and the dismissal of the
case here gives force and effect to the court's admonitions. Having acknowledged the
"potential abusive practices" standard, see State's Brief, pages 18-19; see supra Point IV,
such appellate pronouncements must retain meaning and consequence. The presumptive
bar to refiling clearly encompasses prosecutorial bad faith refilings. State v. Morgan,
2001 UT 87, If 16, 34 P.3d 767 ("when potential abusive practices are involved, the
presumption is that due process will bar refiling").4.
Dismissing a case based on prosecutorial bad faith or abusive filing practices is a remedy akin to
the dismissal of a case based on the bad faith misconduct of a police officer. Regardless of the overall
strength of a case, an officer's improper action may doom an otherwise legitimate prosecutorial filing.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). Pursuant to
its plain language, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule would not be able to save such
isolated instances of police bad faith misconduct. Prosecutorial bad faith should not be afforded any
lesser standard, especially with the heightened Rule 11 certification and investigative requirement
imposed on attorneys. Utah R. Civ. P. 11.
Dismissing a case at the outset - before or at the time of filing - should not be viewed with
unnecessary trepidation. By definition, bad faith filings should be prohibited and would constitute a very
small number of cases. However, each and every bad faith prosecutorial refiling must be deemed
inexcusable. In other contexts, rules and case law often prevent a court from considering procedurally
deficient filings - notwithstanding the fact that those filings may have been better intentioned than the
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court may be aided in its decision making process by oral argument from the
parties. Mr. Ceron requests oral argument.
CONCLUSION
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion under the circumstances of
this case. Mr. Ceron requests this Court to affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.

SUBMITTED this 16th day of July, 2010.
Ronald S. Fujiflo
Attorney for Mr. Ceron

one at issue here. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (Government may move to dismiss an otherwise
meritful appeal if defendant does not timely file a notice of appeal - thus, just as dismissal of a case may
be a remedy for the Government in a criminal case based on afilingerror, dismissal of a case may be a
remedy for a defendant in a criminal case).
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Addendum A
(Rules, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions)

RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action
as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.

Utah R. Civ. P. 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers;
representations to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit
or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an
affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may
submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature and the
party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized pursuant to
Utah Code Section 46-1-16.
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the
violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall
not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of
the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion
the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the
motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible
for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision
(b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a

direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned.
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions
that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.

Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a). Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an
information or indictment dismissed.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(a). Appeals - When proper.
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

U.S. Amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

